EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-49. November 12, 1945. ]
WILLIAM F. PERALTA, Petitioner, v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent.
William F. Peralta, in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Tañada, for Respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag, as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government, because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory (Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342); and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations.
2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND EXCLUSIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION — The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT. — With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.
4. VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. — It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art LII, sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.
5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BY SAID ACT NO. 65 AND ORDINANCE NO. 7 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. — The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION, AFTER REOCCUPATION OR LIBERATION. — The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (Hall’s International Law, seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part Ii, War, pp. 97, 98; Wheaton’s International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 245.)
Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
7. ORDINANCE NO. 7 NULLIFIED BY OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — Ordinance No. 7 issued by President Laurel, of the "Republic of the Philippines" under the Japanese regime, was nullified by the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944.
8. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — The October Proclamation was issued by General MacArthur in keeping with the official statement issued by the President of the United States of October 23, 1943, denying recognition or sympathy to the collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic."cralaw virtua1aw library
9. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Ordinance No. 7 is incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern nations, and can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness.
10. WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — The provisions of Ordinance no. 7 as to issuance of search warrants are repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3), of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the Constitution of the Philippines, search warrants should be issued only by a judge.
11. HABEAS CORPUS — Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, is violative of one of the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution of the Philippines.
12. SELF-INCRIMINATION — The criminal procedure authorized by Ordinance No. 7, in relation with Executive Order No. 157, is violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
13. REVOLTING PROCEDURE. — The procedure provided under Ordinance No. 7 is so revolting, so nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes real courage to keep one’s equanimity when analyzing it. It is beyond comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure, which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.
14. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD BE RETAINED JEALOUSY — It is necessary to be careful to retain jealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It was acquired as a result of protests against all inquisitorial and third degree procedure.
15. THIRD DEGREE PROCEDURES. — We must not forget that even during normal times, under the twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in America and in the Philippines, it was heard not rarely denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means.
16. EVERYBODY’S SECURITY JEOPARDIZED. — Even with the existence of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, there are officers of the law who cannot resist the temptation of using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent of guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self- incrimination, and no man, however innocent be may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.
17. APPEAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ACCUSED. — Under the provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines (Art. VIII, sec. 2), the right of appeal has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights of all accused in the Philippines.
18. ID., REASONS OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. To reduce to the minimum the effects of such innate human weakness, they provided n our fundamental law that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused.
19. INSTRUMENTALITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. It is one of the means considered necessary to better serve the supreme interest of the people.
20. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ABRIDGED. — The summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. 7 abridged the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
21. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VIOLATED. — The summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7 violates the constitutional principle that all accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
22. THE HAGUE CONVENTION. — The Hague Convention of 1899 is flagrantly violated by the enactment of Ordinance No. 7.
23. INTERNATIONAL LAW. — Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to his own territory, after expelling the invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or by nullifying any and all acts of the invader.
24. DECISION RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY UNENFORCEABLE. — The decision is by which petitioner was convicted and is being held for life, having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning, and acting under the authority of a foreign state, the Emperor or the Imperial Government of Japan, is unenforceable.
25. VESTIGES OF A PEOPLE SPIRITUALLY PERVERTED AND DEBASED. — The process and judgment under which petitioner has been convicted is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country.
26. PERFECTION OF ELEMENTAL HUMAN CONCEPTS. — The procedure here in question exhibits either inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely the high purposes of a judicial procedure.
2. VALIDITY OF THE CREATION OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL AND EXCLUSIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION — The so called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of a political complexion, for it is a mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
3. VALIDITY OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR SAID COURT. — With respect to the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate these precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure, than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe.
4. VALIDITY OF ACT NO. 65 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. — It was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art LII, sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.
5. POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE CRIMES PENALIZED BY SAID ACT NO. 65 AND ORDINANCE NO. 7 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. — The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, and the crimes against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.
6. VALIDITY OF SENTENCES DURING OCCUPATION FOR CRIMES OF POLITICAL COMPLEXION, AFTER REOCCUPATION OR LIBERATION. — The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (Hall’s International Law, seventh edition, p. 518; Westlake, International Law, Part Ii, War, pp. 97, 98; Wheaton’s International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 245.)
Per PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
7. ORDINANCE NO. 7 NULLIFIED BY OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — Ordinance No. 7 issued by President Laurel, of the "Republic of the Philippines" under the Japanese regime, was nullified by the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944.
8. THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION. — The October Proclamation was issued by General MacArthur in keeping with the official statement issued by the President of the United States of October 23, 1943, denying recognition or sympathy to the collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic."cralaw virtua1aw library
9. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Ordinance No. 7 is incompatible with the fundamental principles and essential safeguards in criminal procedure, universally recognized in civilized modern nations, and can only be justified by a retrogressive and reactionary mentality developed under the social, cultural, and political atmosphere of the era of darkness.
10. WARRANTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — The provisions of Ordinance no. 7 as to issuance of search warrants are repugnant to the Filipino sense of right in the matter of warrants of search and seizure, sense of right which has been clearly and definitely stereotyped in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3), of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the Constitution of the Philippines, search warrants should be issued only by a judge.
11. HABEAS CORPUS — Section 7 of Ordinance No. 7, suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, is violative of one of the fundamental guarantees in the Constitution of the Philippines.
12. SELF-INCRIMINATION — The criminal procedure authorized by Ordinance No. 7, in relation with Executive Order No. 157, is violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.
13. REVOLTING PROCEDURE. — The procedure provided under Ordinance No. 7 is so revolting, so nauseating, and so opposed to human nature, that it takes real courage to keep one’s equanimity when analyzing it. It is beyond comprehension how a man, endowed with reason, could devise such an execrable system of judicial procedure, which is but a shameless mockery of the administration of justice.
14. THE GUARANTEE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION SHOULD BE RETAINED JEALOUSY — It is necessary to be careful to retain jealously the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. It was acquired as a result of protests against all inquisitorial and third degree procedure.
15. THIRD DEGREE PROCEDURES. — We must not forget that even during normal times, under the twentieth century lights, just before the last global war started, in America and in the Philippines, it was heard not rarely denunciations of third degree procedures employed by agents of the law. This very Supreme Court, not only once, had to deal with cases where such tactics were conclusively proved. Even today, among criminal cases we have under consideration, there is evidence of confessions exacted through cruel and brutal means.
16. EVERYBODY’S SECURITY JEOPARDIZED. — Even with the existence of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, there are officers of the law who cannot resist the temptation of using their power to compel, through third degree methods, innocent of guilty persons to admit involuntarily real or imaginary offenses. Let us allow changes tending to nullify the protection against self- incrimination, and no man, however innocent be may be, shall be secure in his person, in his liberty, in his honor, in his life.
17. APPEAL IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ALL ACCUSED. — Under the provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines (Art. VIII, sec. 2), the right of appeal has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights of all accused in the Philippines.
18. ID., REASONS OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The drafters of our Constitution, taught by the unerring lessons of human experience, came to the conclusion that mistake is one of the most irretrievable human weaknesses. To reduce to the minimum the effects of such innate human weakness, they provided n our fundamental law that appeal to the highest tribunal of the land may be enjoyed by any accused.
19. INSTRUMENTALITY IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE. — The Supreme Court is just one of the instrumentalities created by the Constitution in the service of the people. It is one of the means considered necessary to better serve the supreme interest of the people.
20. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS ABRIDGED. — The summary procedure in criminal cases under Ordinance No. 7 abridged the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
21. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE VIOLATED. — The summary procedure established by Ordinance No. 7 violates the constitutional principle that all accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
22. THE HAGUE CONVENTION. — The Hague Convention of 1899 is flagrantly violated by the enactment of Ordinance No. 7.
23. INTERNATIONAL LAW. — Under international law, under the most elemental principles of law, the legitimate government, once restored to his own territory, after expelling the invader, enjoys the absolute freedom of not recognizing or by nullifying any and all acts of the invader.
24. DECISION RENDERED UNDER FOREIGN AUTHORITY UNENFORCEABLE. — The decision is by which petitioner was convicted and is being held for life, having been rendered by a tribunal created, functioning, and acting under the authority of a foreign state, the Emperor or the Imperial Government of Japan, is unenforceable.
25. VESTIGES OF A PEOPLE SPIRITUALLY PERVERTED AND DEBASED. — The process and judgment under which petitioner has been convicted is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country.
26. PERFECTION OF ELEMENTAL HUMAN CONCEPTS. — The procedure here in question exhibits either inversion, retroversion, subversion, or perversion of elemental human concepts. It ignores completely the high purposes of a judicial procedure.
D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial for violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights" ; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff- appellant, v. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L- 22 (p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas v. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States v. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott v. United States (20 Wall., 459).
The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curi
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights" ; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff- appellant, v. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L- 22 (p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas v. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn v. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States v. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott v. United States (20 Wall., 459).
The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curi
