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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-7. January 22, 1946. ]

ANTONIO CO TIAMCO, Petitioner, v. POMPEYO DIAZ, Judge of First Instance of Manila, YAO BOOM SIM (alias Co Hue), YAO KA TIAM (alias Chua Kui), and SY GUI GAM (alias Go Si Pio), Respondents.

Ramon Diokno, for Petitioner.

Bernardino Guerrero and J. G. Manarang, for Respondents.

SYLLABUS


1. ACTION; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; WHEN IS DEMAND A PREREQUISITE. — A demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.

2. ID.; LEASE; EXPIRATION OF TERM; NOTICE UNNECESSARY. — A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him even before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 72, section 2.

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER; TACIT RENEWAL OF LEASE A MATTER OF DEFENSE. — There may be a tacit renewal of a lease (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days as provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessor’s acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal, in such case, being a new contract (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, p. 619), is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense.

4. ID.; ID.; LACK OF ALLEGATION REGARDING NOTICE TO QUIT CURED BY EVIDENCE. — Where a notice to quit was in fact made, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint, and said notice had been offered and admitted in the municipal court as evidence, the deficiency of the complaint, supposing there was any, was cured by evidence.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON MATTER NOT ALLEGED IN PLEADING AGAINST OBJECTION OF ADVERSE PARTY; AMENDMENT OF PLEADING BEFORE ALLOWING EVIDENCE. — When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON AMENDMENT NOT TO BE APPLIED RIGIDLY TO MUNICIPAL COURT PARTICULARLY WHERE NO SURPRISE OR PREJUDICE IS CAUSED TO OBJECTING PARTY. — Although the municipal court failed to order an amendment before admitting objected evidence, the same may be allowed as a harmless error, since the rule on amendment should not be rigidly applied to said court which is not one of record and where the failure does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the objecting party. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.

7. COURTS; BRANCH OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO RESPECT FINAL AND EXECUTED JUDGMENT OF ANOTHER BRANCH. — Where a branch of the Court of First Instance has judicial knowledge of a judgment of another branch ordering the municipal court to admit certain evidence, which judgment has become final and obeyed, the former is in duty bound to give due regard and full weight to said final and executed judgment.

8. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PURPOSE OF RULES OF PLEADINGS; ELIMINATION OF PROCEDURAL POINTS. — Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points.

9. ID.; COMPLAINT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REGLEMENTARY FORM. — The complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the municipal court, which is not only a substantial, but almost a literal, copy of the form given in the Rules of Court, is sufficient.

10. ID.; ID.; FORM PROVIDED BY LAW IS PART OF THAT LAW. — A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in administering the law we have no will but the will of the law. The form provided by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental policy. It discloses that in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING FORM. — The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal courts who are in close contact with the masses.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY WHEN COMPLAINT IS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS OR INDEFINITE. — Simplicity of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure. Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous or indefinite (See Rule 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules.

13. MANDAMUS; PROPRIETY IN CASE OF DISMISSAL OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION. — As to the propriety of the present action for mandamus, little need be said. Unlawful detainer is summary in nature and requires speedy action, and since the dismissal is predicated upon a misconstruction of the law regarding the court’s jurisdiction, the writ may be granted.

Per PERFECTO, M., concurrent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

14. REQUERIMIENTO EN CAUSAS DE DESAHUCIO. — No existe en la ley ni en el reglamento judicial disposicion alguna exigiendo se alegue en una demanda de desahucio el requerimiento para desocupar mencionado en el articulo 2 de la Regla Judicial 72.

15. JURISDICCION DEL JUZGADO MUNICIPAL. — Constando de autos que la demanda es una de desahucio, por detentacion de bien raiz, es de la competencia del Juzgado Municipal de Manila.

16. DEMANDA SUFICIENTE. — Una demanda redactada de acuerdo con el modelo No. 1 del apendice del Reglamento judicial es suficiente. Mientras no se revoque la disposicion reglamentaria declarando suficiento dicho modelo, el mismo Supremo Tribunal esta impedido para negarse a dar efecto a dicha disposicion.

17. PRONTO DESPACHO DE UN RECURSO. — El 26 de abril, 1945, se presento demanda de mandamiento perentorio ante el Juez Mamerto Roxas del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila. Se presento contestacion el 27 de abril. El 28 de abril, se dicto decision concediendo el recurso. Esta pronta actuacion del Juez Roxas es un ejemplo que merece ser tenido en cuenta por todos los funcionarios judiciales.

18. JUSTICIA DENEGADA. — La justicia retrasada es justicia denegada, y es necesario para corregir el mal, que los funcionarios judiciales renueven, como yna constanta profesion de fe, los compromisos que han asumido en sus juramentos como abogados y como jueces.

19. JURISDICCION CONFERIDA POR LA LEY. — La jurisdiccion conferida a un juzgado municipal sobre asuntos de desahucio no puede ser modificada ni condicionada por la Corte Suprema.

20. PRONUNCIAMIENTOS QUE NO OBLIGAN. — Los pronunciamientos en el asunto de Gumiran contra Gumiran (21 Jur. Fil., 174-178, 184) invocados en este asunto son "dicta" que no tienen fuerza, de doctrina.

21. GUIA REGLAMENTARIA. — El modelo No. 1 del apendice del Reglamento judicial se ha adoptado como un guia. Como tal, no debe extraviar.

22. LEGISLACION JUDICIAL. — Cuando adopto el modelo No. 1, el Supremo Tribunal legislo que una demanda redactada de acuerdo con el es suficiente para todos los propositos legales.

23. EL DERECHO FILIPINO. — El derecho Filipino no es estatico no decadente. Se conoce la sabiduria de sincronizarse con el ritmo del progreso.

24. ETIMOLOGIA DE LOS VOCABLOS "FORMA" Y "MODELO." — En el texto de la opinion se expone la etimologia de los dos vocablos.

25. SIMPLIFICACION PROCESAL. — La relacion del modelo No. 1 obedece el proposito de simplificar los procedimientos en asuntos sumarios de usurpacion y detentacion de bienes inmuebles para hacerlos mas accesibles al hombre comun.

26. SENCILLEZ. — Los procedimientos judiciales, en general, deben caracterizarse por la sencillez, por la brevedad, por la calidad, para que puedan rendir la maxima utilidad en el servicio de la administracion de justicia.

27. TECNICISMOS LEGALES. — Los tecnicismos legales deben eliminarse en beneficio de los litigantes pobres, los sencillos campesinos, el hombre de la calle, el obrero agobiado por la tarea del dia y los problemas financieros de su pobreza.

28. DORADO Y VISTA contra VIRIÑA. — En la opinion se analiza la decision en el asunto de Dorado y Vista contra Viriña (34 Jur. Fil., 282).

29. LOS TRIBUNALES SON SERVIDORES Y REPRESENTANTES DEL PUEBLO. — Si han de ser fieles a sus funcionarios representativos, deben ofrecer los medios adecuados para que el pueblo pueda disfrutar de una eficiente, expedita, y recta administracion de justicia.

30. SIMPLIFICACION FORENSE. — El sentido juridico de la humanidad se manifiesta en el esfuerzo de los innovadores y renovadores del sistema procesal, encaminado a simplificar la practica forense.


D E C I S I O N


MORAN, C.J. :


Antonio Co Tiamco filed an action in the Municipal Court of Manila against Yao Boom Sim (alias Co Hue), Yao Ka Tiam (alias Chua Kui), and Sy Gui Gam (alias Go Si Pio) for unlawful detainer of the building located at 503 Sto. Cristo Street, Manila. At the trial, plaintiff offered Exhibit A as evidence, which is a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon defendants prior to the action. Objection was made to the evidence upon the ground that the fact sought to be proved thereby was not alleged in the complaint. The objection was sustained, and an action for mandamus was brought by plaintiff to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The writ of mandamus was granted, and when the trial was resumed in the municipal court, the evidence was admitted. After trial, judgment was rendered against defendants who appealed to the Court of First Instance. The notice, Exhibit A, was a part of the record elevated on appeal. In the Court of First Instance, the complaint filed in the municipal court was reproduced. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of a notice to quit or vacate the premises served upon them prior to the action and, therefore, the municipal court had no original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and, as a consequence, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The motion was sustained and the case dismissed. Hence, this action for mandamus against the Court of First Instance of Manila to reinstate the petitioner’s case.

We believe, and so hold, that the order of dismissal is erroneous on the following grounds: (1) It relies on a wrong construction of the Rules of Court; (2) it is unwarranted under the circumstances of the case; and (3) the complaint filed is sufficient in itself.

1. We will begin by reviewing the construction placed by the respondent court on a provision of our Rules of Court. The position taken by the respondent court is that, in all actions for unlawful detainer by a landlord against a tenant, a demand, as required by Rule 72, section 2, is jurisdictional. Such provision of the Rules is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Landlord to proceed against tenant only after demand. — No landlord, or his legal representative or assign, shall bring such action against a tenant for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease, unless the tenant shall have failed to pay such rent or comply with such conditions for a period of fifteen days, or five days in the case of building, after demand therefor, made upon him personally, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no persons be found thereon." (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent from this provision that a demand is a pre- requisite to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is "for failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease," and not where the action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term. This is in conformity with articles 1565 and 1581 of the Civil Code.

"ART. 1565. If the lease has been made for a fixed period, it expires on the day fixed without the necessity of any notice." (Emphasis ours.)

"ART. 1581. If no term has been fixed for the lease, it shall be understood as from year to year when an annual rent has been fixed, from month to month when the rent is monthly, and from day to day when it is daily.

"In every case the lease ceases, without the necessity of a special notice, upon the expiration of the term." (Emphasis ours.)

A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the necessity of any notice 1 to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant withholding the property unlawfully "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied," as provided in Rule 72, section 1. In other words upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful detainer may immediately be brought against him ever before the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 72, section 2.

Indeed, upon the expiration of the lease, there may be a tacit renewal thereof (tacita reconduccion), as when, with the acquiescence of the lessor, the lessee continues enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days, as provided in article 1566 of the Civil Code; and the lessor’s acquiescence may be inferred from his failure to serve a notice to quit. (10 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 619.) But tacit renewal in such case, being a new contract (10 Manresa Codigo, Civil, p. 619), is a matter of defense which may be alleged by defendant in his answer, no allegation being necessary in the complaint by way of anticipation of such defense (Canfield v. Tobias, 21 Cal., 349).

2. Passing now to the facts of the case before us, we find that there has been in that case a notice to quit, though not specifically pleaded in the complaint. That notice, which is Exhibit A, has been offered and admitted in the municipal court as evidence. And even supposing, without conceding, that the complaint is deficient in that regard, the deficiency was cured by evidence. True that this evidence was admitted upon objection of the defendant. But there is nothing wrong in that admission even applying Rule 17, section 4, which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Amendment to conform to evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence." (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him a continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence. Of course, the court, before allowing the evidence, as a matter of formality, should allow an amendment of the pleading, and the municipal court did not do so in the instant case. (Since, however, the municipal court is not one of record, the rule on amendments should not therein be rigidly applied. And, furthermore, where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties. (Rule 52, section 3; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil., 315; Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921.)

It is true that when the case was dismissed by the respondent court, it was there on appeal and for trial de novo, independently of any evidence that had been presented in the municipal court. But the admissibility of the notice to quit as evidence, should have been considered by the respondent court as a closed question in so far as its jurisdiction was concerned, for it was for mandamus, issued a writ compelling the municipal court to admit the evidence. The jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ was never questioned. The judgment rendered by the court is such action had become final, the appeal taken therefrom having been dismissed by the court. And the judgment was executed by the municipal court by admitting the evidence then in question. All these circumstances were within the knowledge of the respondent court at the time it acted upon the motion to dismiss. It may be argued that, as a general rule, mandamus does not lie to control rulings on questions of evidence in order not to delay the trial of cases and because the proper remedy is appeal. But when the writ has been issued and has become final and has been obeyed, it is perfectly valid and should be respected. Specially is this so in the instance case where, as will be shown later, the complaint filed was sufficient and under its allegations the municipal court has bound to admit the evidence.

We, therefore, believe and so hold that the respondent court having judicial knowledge of the mandamus proceedings was in duty bound to give due regard and full weight to the final and executed judgment therein rendered and, had it done so, it would have found that the supposed deficiency of the complaint pointed out in the motion to dismiss had already been supplied by evidence admitted by order of one of its branches; that the curative evidence was already before it as a part of the record elevated on appeal by the municipal court; and that to throw away the whole case only because the complaint was silent on a fact well known to all the parties and to the court, was certainly to defeat the paramount interests of justice for the sake of a useless technicality. It was a useless technicality, because if the purpose of the pleading is to apprise the adverse party and the court of the essential facts, that purpose is sufficiently accomplished once the court and the adverse party have acquired a judicial knowledge of the real issues. Rules of pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be property laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. The new rules are really simple and liberal and, in the language of Professor Sunderland, "the purpose which they seek to accomplish is to eliminate technical matters by removing the basis for technical objections, to make it as difficult as impossible, for cases to go off on procedural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient, as can be done." (Vol. XIII, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1939 [No. 1], p. 1.)

We conclude, therefore, that the dismissal of the action is unwarranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

3. But we prefer to base our decision not alone upon the peculiarities of the case but upon an important rule of policy. We hold that the complaint filed with the municipal court is sufficient. It reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Plaintiff alleges that defendants unlawfully withhold from him the possession of the building located at No. 503 Sto. Cristo St., Manila.

"Wherefore he prays that he be restored to the possession of said premises, with damages and costs.

"Manila, 20 April 1945."cralaw virtua1aw library

This complaint is almost a verbatim copy of Form No. 1 of the Rules of Court, which in turn is a copy of the form provided in section 81 of our former Code of Civil Procedure. The form as provided in the Rules is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FORM 1. — Complaint for Ejectment

"Plaintiff alleges that defendant has unlawfully turned him out of possession (or unlawfully withholds from him the possession, as the case may be) of certain lands and building (here describe the premises), situated in the municipality of __________________.

"Wherefore, he prays that he be restored to the possession of said premises, with damages and costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Substantial compliance with this from is sufficient according to the Rules. The complaint filed in the municipal court is not only a substantial, but almost a literal, compliance with the form. It has been held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A complaint in unlawful detainer, before a justice, substantially in the form given in Rev. St. p. 780, is sufficient." (Cabanne v. Spaulding, 14 Mo. App., 312.)

"That a statement in unlawful detainer in justice court, which is in the form given in Rev. St. 1880, p. 2262, and Rev. St. 1855, Append., is sufficient, is stare decisis." (Bradford v. Tilly, 65 Mo. App., 181; 2 Mo. App. Rep’r., 1204.)

"A complaint setting forth a charge of unlawful entry and detainer in the language of the statute is sufficient." (Armour Packing Co. v. Howe, 75 P., 1014; 68 Kan., 663.)

"Complaint in a forcible entry and detainer is sufficient if substantially in the words of the statue." (Locke v. Skow, 91 N. W., 572; 3 Neb. [Unof. ], 299.) .

"The complaint need not state the particular facts relied upon to constitute the alleged forcible entry or forcible detention, but it is sufficient if it contains the language of the statue." (Rice v. West, 33 P., 706, overruled. — [1897], Richardson v. Penny, 50 P., 231 6 Okl., 328 [1903]; Greenmeyer v. Coate, 72 P., 377; 12 Okl., 452.)

"In a summary action under Code Civ. Proc., section 1023, for the possession of land, plaintiff need not set out facts constituting his cause of action, the complaint being sufficient where it follows the language of the statue." (Blachford v. Frenzer, 44 Neb., 829; 62 N. W., 1101.)

"In forcible entry or detainer, it is not necessary for the complaint to contain a statement of the particular facts relied on to constitute the alleged forcible entry or detention, but the complaint is sufficient if it is in the language of Wilson’s Rev. & Ann., St., 1903, section 5090, relating to such action." (Schlegel v. Link, 105 P., 652; 25 Okl., 263.)

In Roque v. Logan (40 Off. Gaz. [No. 14], 10th Supp., p. 56), in which damages were not alleged in the body of the complaint but merely in the prayer, the Court, relying upon the form provided in section 81 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, held the complaint to be sufficient. In another case (Aguilar v. Cabrera and Flameño, G. R. No. 49129), for illegal detainer, wherein the complaint was made to conform to Form No. 1 of the Rules, this Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the municipal court to try and decide the case, thus impliedly upholding the sufficiency of the form. Upon the other hand, no case — Filipino or American — has been cited to us holding the view that such form, or a similar one, is not sufficient in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. This form has been a part of our statutes for more than forty years and has been used extensively in the provinces, as is the observation of members of this Court who had been trial judges in the provinces for years, and its sufficiency has never been questioned until now, and now precisely when it is more in consonance with the tendency of modern procedure which is to liberalize the rules of pleadings so as to preclude the failure of actions upon mere technicalities of form.

Our attention is invited to the ruling of this Court in Gumiran v. Gumiran (21 Phil., 174, 179), wherein it was held that "it is a general rule of pleading and practice that in all pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out." But the complaint in said case merely alleged that "the plaintiff has been ’deprived’ of the land of which he is and has been the owner for a long period," and, therefore, is not in accord with the form provided by the Rules. One may be deprived of possession without force and there is no forcible entry; but when plaintiff is alleged to have been turned out of possession by defendant, as is the allegation contained in the form, force is implied (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756), and the complaint is sufficient.

The syllabus in the case of Melliza v. Towle and Mueller (34 Phil., 345, 346) is also relied upon. But the complaint in such case does not allege, according to the very language of this Court, "that possession was unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, or in any other manner required by virtue of a contract, or in any other manner required by section 80" (of the former Code of Civil Procedure), and, evidently, is not in conformity with the form.

The rule laid down in Tengco v. Jocson (43 Phil., 715), applicable in ejection cases, has no application in actions for forcible entry or illegal detainer. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Street in Gonzalez v. Salas (49 Phil., 1), and the ruling laid down in Lizo v. Carandang (2 Off. Gaz. [No. 3], March, 1943), are correct for there is no doubt that a complaint is sufficient where it shows the facts sustaining the action for forcible entry or illegal detainer. There is, however, nothing in said opinion or in said ruling showing the insufficiency or the form here in question.

There is no fairness in holding a form of be insufficient after all the litigants were told by our Rules to follow it. It is said that a form is but an illustration, a guide, or an outline containing a general idea of what may be done. But obviously, it cannot be a good illustration when it leaves something in the dark. It cannot be a right guide when it misguides. And it cannot be an honest outline when it is incomplete and is deceitful. A form provided by law is a part of that law and, as such, it must be respected, regardless of what we might desire as to how it should be. After all, our duty is to construe the law and not our will, for in administering the law we have no will but the will of the law. In the instant case, the form provided by the rules is not a figment of the mind but a practical expression of a fundamental policy. It discloses that in an action for forcible entry a simple allegation in the complaint that defendant turned the plaintiff out of possession is sufficient, for, undoubtedly, the words "turned out" imply force in the taking of the possession. (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752, 756.) And in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is made sufficient, for the words "unlawfully withholding" imply possession on the part of the defendant, which was legal in the beginning having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which has later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. Thus, a form of a pleading is devised which is brief and concise, and though apparently too general, it is so worded as clearly to apprise the defendant of the substance of the claim. Other details like the one- year period within which the action should be brought, and the demand when required to be made by the Rules, must be proved but need not be alleged in the complaint.

It is true that, according to Rule 4, section 3, the complaint in an inferior court shall state "the grounds of action," but no other facts are required in the form to be stated aside from those that are already therein stated, which are thus deemed sufficient grounds for action. In this connection, it must be required to be supplemented by additional facts, the form itself says so by appropriate words enclosed in parenthesis. See, for instance, form No. 3, third paragraph; form No. 4, third paragraph; form No. 7, on third-party complaint, and others. But form No. 1, for complaint in forcible entry or illegal detainer cases, requires no additional statement of facts, except the description of the premises and the name of the municipality where the property is located.

The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of this form of pleading rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. And these cases are to be tried and decided by justice of the peace or municipal courts who are in close contact with the masses. Simple and practical methods of procedure should be afforded these masses so that they may not fail through their ignorance in obtaining a just redress for their grievances. Poor and ignorant people living in distant barrios and towns and peacefully enjoying their small pieces of land and homes, may be driven out of their property and deprived thus of the necessaries of life by unscrupulous and violent individuals, and they may come for protection to the courts of the town completely unaided either because there are no lawyers in the locality or because they have no means to employ the services of such lawyers. By the quality of attention which they may receive in said courts will they learn whether this government is also their own or only of the powerful, rich or intellectual. Moreover, there can hardly be one case out of a hundred which is so fictitious that the defendant is not aware of the trouble complained of, particularly in this kind of cases and in small communities. It is for these reasons that a simple pleading containing a single ultimate fact is made sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the action and to move the court into a prompt investigation of the facts with a view to a quick restoration of the public order perturbed. If, in a singular case, the defendant may not fairly prepare his answer or defense because of the form of the pleading, he may ask for more particulars by discovery through deposition (Rule 18 in connection with Rule 4, section 19), or he may very well wait for the trial and listen to plaintiff’s testimony on details and then ask for a short postponement to prepare his defense, a petition which would not be denied if duly justified.

We have conscientiously weighed the reasons given by some members of the Court holding a contrary view, reasons which are not altogether wrong except that they are pervaded with a spirit of rigid conservatism in utter disregard of Rule 1, section 2, which counsels liberality in the construction and application of procedural rules with a view "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Decisions in American jurisdiction prior to the procedural reform may be found in support of the contrary view — decisions which are either obsolete or applicable only in ordinary civil actions triable in inferior courts. In solving procedural problems, the progressive and liberal spirit of the reform should be our beacon light.

Simplicity of pleading is the ideal of modern procedure. Under the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite (see Rules 8, section 1), because the defendant, in such case, may ask for more particulars (Rule 16) or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by the Rules. (Rules 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23.) Professor Sunderland once said: "The real test of a good pleading under the new rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too generally." (Vol. XIII, Cincinnati Law Review, January 1939.) This justifies the form of complaint provided by the Rules in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

As to the propriety of the present action for mandamus, little need be said. Unlawful detainer is summary in nature and requires speedy action, and since the dismissal is predicated upon a misconstruction of the law regarding the court’s jurisdiction, the writ may be granted.

For all the foregoing, it is ordered that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering it to try the petitioner’s case after defendant has answered, and to continue the same to final judgment, with costs against defendants-respondents.

Ozaeta, Paras, Hilado, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


PERFECTO, M., concurrente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Concurrimos con la decision redactada por el Presidente del Supremo Tribunal. La prolongada deliberacion sobre este asunto nos ha obligado, sin embargo, a redactar esta opinion.

El recurrente ha entablado el presente recurso extraordinario de "mandamus" para que el Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Juez de Primera Instancia de Manila, reponga la causa civil de desahucio No. 70205 de dicho tribunal, entablada por el recurrente contra los tres ultimos recurridos en el presente asunto, la tramine en su fondo, y la decida de acuerdo con sus meritos.

Como un remedio adicional, se pide la abreviacion de los tramites de este recurso, dada su naturaleza urgente, para que pueda decidirse con prontitud.

Exceptuando detalles de poca importancia, no existe controversia sobre los hechos que had dado origen al recurso entablado.

El 20 de abril, 1945, el recurrente presento en el Juzgado Municipal de Manila contra Yoo Boon Sim y otros, una demanda por detentacion ilegal, jurada y redactada en forma analoga que el modelo o formula No. 1 del Reglamento judicial.

El 26 de abril, 1945, los demandados contestaron impugnando la jurisdiccion del Juzgado, alegando que la demanda no expone hechos que constituyen suficiente motivo de accion.

En la vista, el recurrente ofrecio como prueba una carta requiriendo a los demandados a desalojar la finca en cuestion el 16 de abril, 1945. Los demandados objetaron a la admision de dicha carta, sobre el fundamento de que dicho requerimiento no se alego en la demanda. El Juzgado Municipal sostuvo la objecion.

El dia 26 de abril, 1945, el recurrente solicito del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila un mandamiento perentorio para obligar al Juzgado Municipal a recibir como prueba la citada carta.

El dia 27 de abril, 1945, el Juez Municipal recurrido contesto sostemiendo la teoria de que no es suficiente una demanda que siguiera el modelo reglamentario, siendo necesario que el demandante en una causa de desahucio alegara el requerimiento de desalojar para que pudiera probar que hubo semejante requerimiento.

El dia 28 de abril, 1945, el Juez Mamerto Roxas, del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, dicto decision ordenando al Juez Mariano Nable, del Juzgado Municipal, a que reciba como prueba la carta de requerimiento en cuestion, sosteniendo la teoria de que el rechazar dicha prueba por la razon de no haberse alegado el requerimiento en el texto de la demanda, siendo esta una practica reproduccion de la formula No. 1 del apendice del Reglamento judicial, es obra de acuerdo con un tecnicismo impractico o innecesario, del cual debe prescindirse en especial en asuntos de urgencia, como los de desahucio.

El 2 de mayo, 1945, los demandados pidieron la reconsideracion de la decision del Juez Roxas. Fue denegada el 4 de mayo, 1945. El 29 de mayo, 1945, por haberse cumplido el mandamiento contenido en la decision, fue denegada la apelacion contra esta.

El 4 de mayo, 1945, el Juez Nable dicto decision de desahucio contra los demandados.

Estos apelaron. Ya remitida la causa al Juzgado de Primera Instancia, el 29 de mayo, 1945, los demandados y apelantes presentaron mocion de sobreseimiento, sosteniendo que dicho Juzgado carece de jurisdiccion y de que la demanda no alega hechos que fueran suficiente motivo de accion. La mocion se funda sobre el silencio de la demanda acerca del requerimiento hecho en la carta en cuestion.

En su contestacion del 1.
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