Home of ChanRobles Virtual Law Library

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-16. January 31, 1946. ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICENTE SOPE and MARIO CRUZ, Defendants-Appellants.

Francisco Angeles, for Appellants.

First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Acting Solicitor Apolinio V. Santiago, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS


1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY; EVIDENCE; SUFFICIENCY OF TESTIMONY OF SINGLE WITNESS. — The testimony of the offended party is quite reasonable, and the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe her demeanor while on the stand gave it full weight and credit as against those of the appellants. Moreover, it has been repeatedly held by this court that the testimony of a single witness which satifies the court in a given case is sufficient to convict.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFER TO SETTLE BY ONE CONSPIRATOR. — The repeated offer of one conspirator constitutes a strong indication and an implied admission of guilt of said conspirator and of the two accused and appellants.

3. ID.; ID.; EXTRACTION OF MONEY BY IMPERSONATING OFFICERS OF THE LAW AND BY THREATS AND INTIMIDATION. — The accused, by pretending that they were officers of the law and by employing threats and intimidation of obtain, as they did, from the offended party the amount of P200, are guilty of the crime of robbery.

4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION TO BE DETERMINED BY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. — The prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party.


D E C I S I O N


JARANILLA, J.:


The two appellants herein, Vicente Sope and Mario Cruz, were charged with the crime of robbery in criminal case No. 7170 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, while their companion, Tomas Dimalanta, was accused in a separate information in criminal case No. 7443 of the same court of having conspired with Vicente Sope and Mario Cruz in the commission thereof. On motion of the fiscal and without any objection from the defense, a joint trial was held of both cases, at the conclusion of which the court rendered a decision finding all the accused guilty of the crime of robbery and sentenceing each and every one of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six months of arresto mayor to three years, eight months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the complaint in the amount of P80 and to pay the costs. Tomas Dimalanta did not appeal; but the other two accused did, submitting for our consideration two assignments of error allegedly committed by the cour below, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The court a quo erred in finding that "the accused Vicente Sope followed on foot,’ thereby assuming, without proof, that he was with his coaccused during all the time that the crime, if any, was allegedly committed.

"2. The court a quo erred in sustaining the charge and in convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant."cralaw virtua1aw library

These assignments of error may be reduced to the sole proposition that the facts proven at the trial do not establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The complainant, Juliana Chan, testified that at about six o’clock in the evening of April 8, 1945, when she was on her way home after selling a ring in the Bambang market, a calesa suddenly stopped in front of her, from which the appellants Sope and Cruz, whom she clearly identified, alighted. Sope pointed his revolver to her, while Cruz poked her back with a hard object. The other accused, Tomas Dimalanta, remained in the calesa. Cruz ordered her to board the rig, which she did, followed by him. Sope did not join them but stayed behind.

Cruz and Dimalanta pretended to be peace officers who had apprehended her because they had found her violating the law, pointing to her a bag in the rig which they themselves had brought along, by which they meant that she was unlawfully dealing in U. S. Army goods.

The calesa was ordered to stop at Herbosa Street in front of the Victory Cafe where the two accused even asked the complainant to take coffee with them. But all the time they kept intimidating and threatening her if she did not give them money. As a result of their concerted action, she finally gave them P200.

After the offended party had reported the commission of the crime to the proper authorities at the three accused were arrested and after the presentation of the corresponding information against them, Attorney Vega approached the complainant and offered to settle the case on the part of Tomas Dimalanta by paying to her the sum of P200 on condition that she would not testify against Dimalanta because she did not really see the latter among those who had hel her up. The said proposition was turned down by the offended party, although subsequently Attorney Resurreccion managed to pay her the amount of P120, thus leaving P80 unrecovered from the accused.

We have carefully reviewed the evidence in this case and we find that the contention of the appellants to the effect that the trial court erred in convicting them because the facts proven at the trial do not establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot be sustained for the reasons that the material facts above referred to were, in our opinion, conclusively proven in this case. The alleged contradictions, unreasonableness and inconsistencies in the testimony of the principal witness for the prosecution are not serious enough to affect the credibility of said witness nor to merit serious consideration. The testimony of the offended party is quite reasonable, and the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe her demeanor while on the stand gave it full weight and credit as against those of the appellants. Moreover, it has been repeatedly held by this Court that the testimony of a single witness which satisfies the court in a given case is sufficient to convict. (United States v. Cabe, 1 Phil., 265; Unites States v. Dacotan, 1 Phil., 669; United States v. De la Cruz, 4 Phil., 438; United States v. Bastas, 5 Phil., 251; United States v. Sison, 6 Phil., 421; United States v. Sy Quingco, 16 Phil., 416; United States v. Ambrosio, 17 Phil., 295; United States v. Oracion, 18 Phil., 530; Unites States v. Mondejar, 19 Phil., 158; United States v. Callapag, 21 Phil., 262; United States v. Baua, 27 Phil., 103; United States v. Olais, 36 Phil., 828.)

On the other hand, it has been duly established that the offended party was asked by Attorney Vega and then by Attorney Resurreccion on behalf of Tomas Dimalanta, one of the accused, to drop the case upon the refund of the amount of P200 which the three accused had apparently conspired to get from her by means of threats and intimidation. We agree with the Solicitor General that the repeated offer of one conspirator constitutes a strong indication and an implied admission of guilt of said conspirator and of the two accused and appellants in this case. (United States v. Torres, 34 Phil., 994.)

The accused, by pretending that they were officers of the law and by employing threats and intimidation to obtain, as they did, from the offended party the amount of P200, are guilty of the crime of robbery. (See United States v. Smith, 3 Phil., 20; United States v. Dedulo, 31 Phil., 298-301.) .

It is not well founded to consider that the offense committed by the accused appears to be bribery. It seems true that the offended witness was imputed to be carrying a bundle which might have contained contraband, and for fear of discovery of that contraband the husband of the offended party ran away from the scene and did not come back. There exists, however, no evidence regarding said contraband other than the testimony of the accused themselves, which is not positive and convincing. Moreover, it should not escape our attention that said testimony, coming as it does from the accused who naturally want to exculpate themselves, cannot be regarded as free from bias and a desire to so intensify the details thereof as to suit their case. Regarding the disappearance of the husband of the offended party, we believe that nothing unfavorable to the case of the prosecution can be attributed thereby. For all we know, he might have gone to look for a policeman or any other agent of the law to report or make a complaint of what had happened; and, as if to lend support to this view, it has been established in this case that the offende party reported the occurrence to the police and was subsequently investigated by the prosecuting attorney’s office, which was the one that filed the robbery charges against the accused. It was not the offended party who determined what charges to be filed; neither did she have control of the case. What is clear and uncontradicted by the facts of this case is that it was the prosecution attorney’s office that took charge of the investigation and filing of the charges for robbery, and nothing like having so framed her accusation as to make the crime committed by the accused appear to be robbery instead of bribery could be attributed to the offended party. It is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended party.

After considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, we are of the opinion that the prosecuting attorney’s office was right in filing the charges for robbery, it having been clearly proven that one of the accused threatened the offended party with a revolver while another was sticking something hard, possibly a revolver also, against her back and that because of the intimidation employed by the accused since the beginning she was prevailed upon to give them P200.

Another circumstance which should not escape our attention is that, if true that there was a bundle in the rig and that the offended party gave siad sum to the accused as a bribe in view of the supposed contraband that she had, she would not have denounced them to the authorities because, generally, those who bribe do not denounce such act for the reason that they do not want the object thereof, in this case the alleged contraband, to be further disclosed to or discovered by others. Such is not the case here, because it was the offended party herself who denounced the commission of the offenses to the authorities.

In view of all the foregoing, we find that the prosecuting attorney did not commit any error in proceeding against the accused for robbery and that the court a quo did not likewise commit by error in convicting the accused of said crime and in imposing the penalty meted out to them, which is within the range prescribed by law. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed in toto with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions


BRIONES, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

En esta causa no tenemos mas que el testimonio directo de la ofendida, Juliana Chan, en apoyo de la acusacion. Ella insinua, se bien con notoria vaguedad, que los acusados simularon el hallazgo de un contrabando atribuyendole luego la propiedad del mismo (planted evidence). "Mejor sera que Ud. arregle el asunto con nosotros" — dice que la propuso el acusado Mario Cruz, señalando al propio tiempo un saco que habia en la carromata." "Le pregunte que era aquel pequeño saco y me contesto que me lo diria mas tarde" (t. n. t., pag. 5).

Los acusados, en cambio, aseguran que en la tarde de autos ellos sorpredieron a la ofendida llevando consigo un saco lleno de camisas y pantalones de khaki pertenecientes al Ejercito Americano. Segun el acusado Cruz, su companero Tomas Dimalanta, que era agente o policia del C. I. D. (Criminal Investigation Division), suspechando que la ofendida llevaba un contrabando, quiso investigarla. "Bajamos de la carromata — dice Cruz — y el hombre que estaba con Mrs. Chan echo a correr. Le persegui y pregunte si era compañero de Mrs. Chan, y como me contestara que no, lo deje. Me acerque a Mrs. Chan e inspeccione el saco que llevaba y vi que contenia camisad y pantalones de khaki pertenecientes al Ejercito. Entonces mi compañero, que era empleado del C. I. D. (refiriendose a Dimalanta), le dijo a ella que se embarcara en la carromata. . . . Yo estaba comenzando a revolver el contenido del saco, pero Mrs. Chan dijo que esto crearia un escandalo, y que bien podiamos arreglar el asunto" (t. n. t., pags. 27, 28).

Top of Page