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PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-142. October 5, 1946. ]

URSU LUANGCO, ARISTON RAMOS, RESTITUTO REDOÑA, SIMPLICIO IBAÑEZ, and BENITO BAGOHEN, Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF TACLOBAN, LEYTE, Respondent-Appellee.

IGMIDIO LAGERA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF TACLOBAN, LEYTE, Respondent-Appellee.

Antonio Montilla, for Petitioners-Appellants.

Provincial Fiscal Lambo, for Respondent-Appellee.

SYLLABUS


1. JUDGMENTS; COURT OF SPECIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, PUNITIVE SENTENCES OF; INEFFICACY AFTER RESTORATION OF COMMONWEALTH; PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (75 Phil., 285), FOLLOWED. — Applying the decision in Peralta v. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), to the case at bar, it is evident that the punitive sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 of the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, for violation of Act No. 65 promulgated by the Assembly of said Republic, ceased to have any forced and effect after the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and therefore the confinement of the petitioners by virtue of said punitive sentences has become illegal at least after said restoration.


D E C I S I O N


FERIA, J.:


This is an appeal taken by the petitioner Igmidio Lagera from the decision rendered on May 30, 1945, by the Borromeo Veloso, and by all the other petitioners from the decision rendered on February 23, 1945, by the same court presided by Judge Sotero D. Cabahug, in which decisions the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus were denied.

From the decisions appealed from it appears that the petitioners in these two cases (G. R. No. L-142 and G.R. No. L-143), were members of the Philippine Constabulary of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and they were convicted, sometime during the year 1944, of the crime of robbery and of robbery with homicide defined and penalized by Act No. 65 enacted by the Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction, created in Leyte by Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the said Republic.

The definition of the crime of robbery found in the Revised Penal Code of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, was adopted in said Act No. 65 and penalized with a penalty than that imposed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery, if committed by officers and persons, such as the herein petitioners, charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries.

The petitioners, in support of their appeal, allege that "the lower court erred in not holding that Act No. 65 and Ordinance No. 7 of the Republic of the Philippines were null and void ab initio, because (10 the procedure prescribed therein did not afford a fair trial and violated fundamental human rights; and (2) Ordinance No. 7 deprived the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to review, reverse, affirm or modify on appeal final judgments of inferior court in violation of the Constitution;" and "The lower court erred likewise is not holding that the punitive sentences imposed by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 65 and Ordinance No. 7 ceased to have legal force and effect upon the re-establishment or restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is not necessary for us to discuss the first ground or assignment of error, for it is included in the second.

I In the case of Peralta v. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 1285), the decision, concurred in by Messrs. Justices Jaranilla, Pablo, Bengzon, and in its result by Chief Justice Moran, in which the same questions of fact and law were raised and decided, held that the punitive sentence rendered by the Courts of Special Criminal Jurisdiction ceased to have force and effect upon the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and in their respective five separate concurring opinions, Messrs. Justices Ozaeta, De Joya, Perfecto, Hidalgo and Briones held that said punitive sentence was null and void ab initio. Although the dis positive part of the decision of the majority does not constitute a precedent for only five Justice therein, it is plain that all the justices, except Mr. Justice Paras, were unanimous in that said sentence ceased to be effective or valid at least after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. Because if it were null and void ab initio during the Japanese occupation, it must have been necessarily void also after said restoration.

Applying the decision in said case to the present, it is evident that the punitive sentences imposed upon the petitioners by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction, created by Ordinance No. 7 of the President of the so called Republic of the Philippines, for violation of Act No. 65 promulgated by the Assembly of said Republic, ceased to have any force and effect after the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and therefore the confinement of the petitioners by virtue of said punitive sentences has become illegal at least after said restoration.

It may not be amiss to say, in connection with Mr. Justice Paras’ dissenting opinion, that there is no legal way for this court to order the reconstitution of the record of the criminal cases against the appellants, for there is no appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction of Leyte pending before us. The appeal under consideration is from the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte denying appellants’ petition for habeas corpus. Besides, it would be of no avail to order such reconstitution, inasmuch as, we would have after all, to dismiss the case against the appellants for the reasons stated in this decision.

Although it is not necessary to decide in this case, and there is doubt in the minds of some members of this court as to whether the appellants may after their release be prosecuted for robbery under the Revised Penal Code, the writer of this decision is of the opinion that the appellants’ conviction for violation of Act No. 65 and their release on the ground of nullity of the punitive sentence imposed upon them, will not be a bar to their being prosecuted one for robbery under the Revised Penal Code. Because the crime of robbery penalized by this Code is not the same robbery punished by said Act No. 65. The former is an offense punished by a municipal law continued in force by the invader, and the latter is a crime of political complexion created and penalized by an Act, prosecuted under a different procedure, and before a Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction (promulgated and organized by the occupant), all of which became null and of no effect upon the restoration of the legitimate of Commonwealth Government. Besides, as the Court of Special Criminal Jurisdiction that convicted the defendants had no jurisdiction to try offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code, the defendants could not set up the defense of double jeopardy if prosecuted now for robbery under said Code, for they had not been in danger of being convicted thereof by said court, although the robbery under the Penal Code was necessarily included in the robbery penalized by said Act No. 65.

We therefore reverse the decision appealed from and order the release of the petitioners, with costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


PERFECTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On the strength of the theories advanced in our opinions in Co Kim Cham v. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113, 371), and in Peralta v. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), we concur in the reversal of the appealed decision and in the immediate release of petitioners, without costs.

Whether or not, after their release, petitioners-appellants may again be prosecuted for the acts upon which they were tried and convicted under the judicial proceedings declared null and void, is a question not properly by the parties in these cases, and should not be passed upon unless and until an appeal is squarely submitted for our decision.

HILADO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the reversal of the decisions appealed from and the consequent release of petitioners. My grounds are those stated in support of my following opinions, heretofore delivered: (1) my dissenting opinion, both from the main decision and from the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, in Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113 371); (2) my v. concurring opinion in Peralta v. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285); (3) my concurring opinion in People v. Jose (75 Phil., 612(; (4) my dissent in Alcantara v. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 494); (5) my concurring opinion in De Castro v. Court of Appeals (75 Phil., 824); and (6) the doctrine in Jones v. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696, and in the cases therein cited), that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political, question the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects, of what government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. (Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S., 3 Wheat., 246, 324 [4:381, 401]; United States v. Palmer, Id., 610 [471]; The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S., 4 Wheat., 52 [4:512]; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S., 2 Pet., 253, 307, 309 [7:415, 433, 434]; Keene v. M’Donough, 33 U.S., 8 Pet., 308 [8:955]; Garcia v. Lee U.S., 12 Pet., 511, 520 [9:1176]; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S., 13 Pet., 415 [10:226]; United States v. Yorba, 68 U.S., 1 Wall., 412, 423 [17:635]; United States v. Lynde, 78 U.S., 11 Wall., 632, 638 [20:230, 232]. It is equally well settled in England. The Pelican, Edw. Adm. Appx. D; Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim., 213; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 DeG. F. & J., 217, 221, 233; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., L. R., 36 Ch. Div., 489, 497; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus, L.R., 38 Ch. Div., 348, 356, 359)." (137 U.S., 213; 34 Law. ed., 696.)

Finally, this concurring opinion is also based on the considerations stated in my dissenting opinion in Ibañez v. Hernandez (p. 775, post).

PABLO, M., concurrente y disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Los recurrentes fueron acusados y condenados por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Leyte en la causa criminal No. 1, por infraccion ddel articulo 6 de la Ley No. 65 de la Republica establecida por el ejercito japones; en las causas criminales Nos. 2 y 3 por infraccion del articulo 294, parrafos 1.
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