1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; CO-PRINCIPAL OR ACCOMPLICE, WHEN MAY A PERSON BE CONVICTED AS, FOR CRIMINAL ACT OF ANOTHER. — A person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. In other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slaver, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; KNOWLEDGE OF SLAYER’S CRIMINAL INTENT INFERRED FROM PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF CASE. — Knowledge by another of the slayer’s criminal intent may be inferred from the peculiar circumstances of each case such, for instance, as the concert of action and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered in the consummation of the crime.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS, NOT SUFFICIENT. — Simultaneous does not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals.

At about 8 o’clock in the morning of October 21, 1944, appellant Sixto Ibañez, through his brother Alejo Ibañez, summoned the deceased Cosme Magalong to discuss a transaction regarding the sale of some hogs, in which business Sixto and Cosme were partners. When Cosme was approaching Sixto’s house, the latter met him at the gate of yard and both proceeded to discuss the sale of the hogs, the buyers of which were waiting at Sixto’s house. Irineo Ibañez, brother of Sixto, joined the discussion, during the course of which a quarrel ensued. At this moment, one of the trio mentioned the word "fight," and Cosme started to run towards his house. Irineo pursued him, closely followed by Sixto. When they caught up with Cosme, Sixto held Cosme around the neck from behind and proceeded to tighten his grip. While both were thus trudging, Irineo approached, whipped out a dagger and suddenly stabbed Cosme in the chest just below the left nipple. Sixto, followed by Irineo, hurried from the scene of the affray. Cosme died about twenty minutes later, and upon examination, the assistant sanitary inspector of the municipality of Manaoag found that death resulted from hemorrhage caused by the stab wound. Irineo Ibañez is still at large, but Sixto Ibañez was accused and found guilty of the crime of murder, and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs the deceased in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs. Hence, this appeal of Sixto Ibañez.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between the, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. In other words, the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and his presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice; it is, furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former’s criminal intent, should cooperate with moral of material aid in the consummation of the crime. (Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, May 23, 1905, Viada, 5 Supp., p. 169; Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, June 28, 1901, Viada, 4 Supp., p. 196.) Such knowledge, however, may be inferred from the peculiar circumstances of each case such for instance, as the concert of action and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered in the consummation of the crime (People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil., 38.)

The quarrel between the deceased Cosme Magalong and the herein appellant sprang spontaneously out of a business discussion. Both were partners in the trade of raising and hogs and there was no prior ill-feeling between them. Irineo Ibañez was not directly involved in the business but merely obtruded into the discussion to support the interest of his brother Sixto. There was no preconceived plan or agreement between the brothers to assault the deceased, Upon the country, the records of the case clearly show the spontaneity of the occurrence, for the buyers of the hogs were at Sixto’s house ready to consummate the transaction. The subject of their quarrel was a mere incident of such transaction and it was brought about at that very moment by the refusal of the buyers to get one of the hogs with they agreed to purchase.

The fact that the two brothers, Irineo and Sixto, pursued Cosme is no proof that their intention was to kill. There is no proof that they pursued Cosme because they had accepted a challenge coming from him. Apparently, their intention was merely to prevent him from taking from his house a weapon with which to carry out an attack. They were, therefore, just advancing a legitimate defense by preventing an illegitimate aggression. If the intention of a person should be determine from the acts he has actually performed, Sixto’s act of holding Cosme’s neck from behind is no proof of intention to kill. At that time he did not know yet what his brother’s intention was. It is not shown that Sixto knew that his brother was armed. Irineo stabbed Cosme in such a sudden and unexpected manner that one of the eyewitness, Antonio Calagdan, did not even notice that Irineo’s below carried a dagger with it. And Sixto showed surprise when later he saw the blood-stained dagger of his brother Irineo, and asked him "what did you do?" True, the act of Sixto coincided with Irineo’s act of stabbing, but "simultaneous does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose which are the basis of the responsibility of two or more individuals." (United States v. Magcomot, 13 Phil., 386, 389.)

A case directly in point is that of People v. Tamayo (44 Phil., 38). The facts briefly were as follows: A quarrel arose between the accused Hilario Tamayo, Ramon Tamayo, Jose Tamayo, Federico Tibunsay and Teodoro Caspellan on the one hand, and Catalino Carrera (the deceased) and Francisco Carrera on the other, over irrigation water that ran between the properties of both parties. When Hilario Tamayo advanced to break down a dam built by the Carreras, the deceased Catalino Carrerra confronted him threateningly, whereupon Hilario Tamayo seized the deceased firmly by the neck, choking him and rendering him incapable of effectual resistance. Francisco Carrera then intervened to aid his brother and succeeded in separating the two combatants. As soon as Hilario was pulled away from the deceased, Ramon Tamayo closed in and took his turn at holding the deceased and choking him. If was at this moment that Jose Tamayo, son of Ramon, ran up and hit the deceased with a bamboo stick on the side of the head just the left ear. The deceased at once fell limp and Ramon Tamayo continued choking him until dead. The medical examination showed the blow by Jose Tamayo caused the death of Catalino Carrera During the affray, the other two accused, Tibunsay and Caspellan, were standing by, allegedly encouraging their co-accused. The lower court held Hilario, Ramon and Jose Tamayo guilty as principals, and the remaining two as accomplices. On appeal, this court acquitted all of them except Jose Tamayo who was found guilty as a principal and Ramon Tamayo, as accomplice. The guilt of Jose clear since he delivered the fatal blow. Ramon was found guilty as accomplice because the fact that he continued choking the deceased after the low by Jose that the approved of the blow and therefore displayed his participation in the criminal design of Jose. The other appellants were not made liable for the murderous acts Jose Tamayo because of lack of guilty participation in the criminal design of Jose Tamayo.

In order authoritative decisions of this court, defendants were acquitted on facts analogous to those of the case bar. (See United States v. Manayao, 4 Phil., 293; United States v. Magcomot, 13 Phil., 386; United States v. Reyes and Javier, 14 Phil., 27; People v. Ortiz and Zausa, 55 Phil., 993.) the Supreme Court of Spain has likewise rendered similar decisions, as extensively quoted by Viada. (Viada, 2 Supp 116; Decision November 4, 1892, and Decision, December 4, 1889; Viada, 2 Supp., 124, Decision, 1892; Viada, 3 Supp., 142; Decision of November 20, 1985; Viada, 4 Supp., 196; Viada, 5 Supp., 169; Decision of June 28, 1901.)

In Viada, cases holding contrary rulings are also quoted. However, a close scrutiny of these cases reveals the existence of facts or circumstances by which complicity of design or purpose is strongly deducible. In one of these the deceased challenged the two accused, who accepted, assaulted and killed the challenger. The acceptance of the challenge by the two accused and their concert of attack clearly showed a community of purpose and design. (Viada, 5 Supp., 167; Decision of June 13, 1904.) In decision case, after the deceased had already fallen to the ground wounded, the accomplice precede to boot him on the chest and forehead, and by such acts, as the court held, "coopero a sus funestos resultados simultaneamente." (Viada, Vol. 1, 375; Decision of December 29, 1884.) This is similar to the Tamayo case wherein the accused Ramon Tamayo who held the victim was convicted as accomplice, because even after and been fatally injured by Jose Tamayo and was prostrate on the ground, Ramon continued holding and choking him until the victim died.

The case of People v. Aplegido (76 Phil., 571), is not here applicable, for the circumstances therein proved show community of purpose on the part of the defendants.

Appellant’s participation in the criminal intent and design in the killing of Cosme Magalong not having been proven, and such participation being essential to the criminal responsibility charged in the information, judgment is reversed, acquitting the herein appellant Sixto Ibañez, with costs de oficio.

Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.



BRIONES, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No estoy conforme con la decision de la Corete exonerando el apelante, Sixto Ibanez, de toda responsabilidad. Sin astar tampoco conforme con la sentencia del tribunal inferior que el declara responsable como autor del homicidio de autos, crea que el mismo debe ser condenado en concepto de complice.

I. Es de notar que la ponencia se funda no en las pruebas de la defensa (testimoni unico, incorroborado del apelante), sino en las de la misma acusacion. Segun declaracion del apelante, cuando el sujeto al occiso por el cuello su hermano Irineo Ibañez a quo ya le habia inferido a esta la puñalada fatal. El Juez a quo no dio nigun credito a esta declaracion; la mayoria de esta Corte tampoco. Con todo, se le absuelve enteramente, porque, segun la mayoria, no hay prueba de que el apelante, al trincar por el cuello a Cosme Magalong, el occiso, y sujetarle de tal manera paralizando susmovimientos, tuviera conocimiento o participacion en el designio homicida de su hermano Irineo cuando este ataeo a dicho Cosme asestandole una pulialada mortal en la tetilla izquierda. Se arguye que cada cual debe respondel de sus actos, y Sixto Ibanez no debe responder de nada, pues no hizo mas que estrangular o trincar por el cuello al occiso, siendo Irineo el verdadero matador. Creo que esto es un error, y consagrado como jurisprudencia, como doctrina judicial, puede acarreal muy peligrosas consecuencias, sobre todo en una ambiente social como el presente en que los trastornos psiquicos resultantes de una guerra brutal y tremendamente perturbadora de todos los valores, incluso los espirituales, provocan disputas entre los hombres por los motivos mas baladies y predisponen al asesinato y homicidio con una pasmosa y aterradora facilidad. De todos los tiempos, el menos propicio para semejante laxidad es el actual en que el indice de los crimenes de sangre alcanza alturas fantasticas.

El apelante es, cuando menos, respollsable como complice, pues no cabe duda de que trincar por el cuello a Cosme Magalong impidio que este pudiera moverse libremente y defenderse con eficacia contra la puIialada fatal que le infirio Irineo Ibanez, cooperando de esta manera al funesto resultado con actos anteriores y simultaneos — elemento o requisito que caracteriza la complicidad. "Es complice de un delito, dice Viada, el que coopera a su ejecucion por actos anteriores o simultaneos, con tal que no haya tomado parte directa en dicha ejecucion, ni haya forzado o inducido directamente a otros a ejecutarla, ni haya cooperado a su ejecucion por un acto indispensable, pues si existiera una u otra de estas circunstancias, ya no seria complice sino aultor." Los actos de cooperacion de Sixto Ibañez fueron anteriores y simultaneous porque es hecho establecido en la misma ponencia que momentos antes de apuñalar Irineo al oceiso ya aquel (Sixto) le tenia a este sujeto por el cuello y tambien lo tenia asi trincado en el presciso momento de inferirse la punalada; y, usando las mismas palabras del Tribunal Supremo de Espana en una sentencia favorable a esta disidencia, tales actos anteriores y simultaneos "contribuyeron a quitar fuerzas y medios de defensa a la victima, haciendo al principal agresor posible haasta facil lo que de otra manera no hubiera podido realiza." (Sentencia de 24 de Mayo de 1879, Gacetas de 9 y 10 de Agosto.) De no haber Sixto Ibanez trincado por el cuello a Cosme Magalong, no le hubiera sido facil a Irineo acecarse a este sin ninguna oposicion y asestarle una puñalada en la tetilla izquierda, matandole casi instantaneamente.

Viada da cuenta de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Espana arriba citada, de la siguiente manera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A cponsicuencia de una disputa suscitada entre intelfecto y los procsados, estos la emprenden a cachetes con aquel, y sacando uno de ellos una navaja le da un pinchazo en el vientre, que le produce la muerte a las murte a las pocas horas: Ideberan ser calificados de complices de este homicidio los procesados que solo golpearon y maltrataron al interfecto, pero sin herirle? — El Tribunal Supremo ha resuelto la afirmativa, fundandose en que los hechos expuestos, practicados por dichos procesados, no pueden menos de reputarles como complices del homicidio, porque ellos fueron simultaneos al mismo y contribuyeron a quitar fuerzas y medios de defensa a la victima, haciendo al principal agresor posible y hasta facil lo que de otra manera acaso no hubiara podido realizar." (Sentencia de 24 de Mayo de 1879, Gacetas de 9 y 10 de Agosto.) (2 Viada, 5,a Edicion, pags. 430-431.)

Bien analizado, tenemos un caso de complicidad mas acentuado porque mientras en el de Espana arriba citado los pro cesados de responsabilidad secundaria la emprendieron solo a achetes con el occiso, en nuestro caso Sixto Ibañez hizo una cosa mucho mas efectiva que el dar cachetes, pues trinco por el cuello al occiso paralizando sus movimientos e imposibilitando, por tanto, todo medio de defensa, inclusive el poder correr y escaparse.

II. Se dice, sin embargo, que Sixto no es responsable ni como complice porque no se ha probado que estuviese concertado con Irineo en el designio de matar; que el acto de este asestando una punalada al interfecto fue Instantaneo, sin que Sixto hubiese tenido tiempo para prevenirlo o pararlo; que ni siquiera hay prueba de que Sixto supiese que su hermano estaba armado.

Convengo en que la complicidad implica cierta participacion en la voluntad o proposito generador del delito, pues cooperar significa desear o querer en comun una cosa. Pero esa voluntad o proposito comun no quiere decir necesariamente expresa inteligencia, pues puede explicarse o deducirse de las circunstancias de cada caso (Pueblo contra Aplegido, 76 Phil., 571). La participacion de Sixto Ibañez en el designio homicida no tenemos que Ibuscarla en su fuero Interno, pues eso pertenece a los entresijos de la volutad y no es susceptible de prueba directa, sino tenemos que deducirla de las circunstancias. Las pruebas demuestran que al tragico incidente habia precedido una disputa acalorada entre el occiso por un lado, y los hermanos Sixto e Irineo Ibanez por otro lado; que en el calor del altercado sono la palabra"