FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-1397. August 30, 1947. ]
SEVERINA EBERO AND BENEDICTA CALIZAR, assisted by her husband Hilarion Resurreccion, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO CAÑIZARES, Judge of First Instance of Quezon, JOSE ALABASTRO, and AURORA BURGOS, Respondents.
Villena, Nicolas & Bartolome, for Petitioners.
Alfonso Farcon for respondents Alabastro and Burgos.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION , LOSS OF, AFTER EXPIRATION OF TIME TO APPEAL. — Under the Rules of Court and a matter of public policy, jurisdiction over the cause ceases with the expiration of the time of appeal, and thereafter the court has no power to correct or amend the judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION AS MATTER OF RIGHT EXECUTION NOT TO DEVIATE, MATERIALLY FROM JUDGMENT. — Upon the expiration of the time of appeal when no appeal has been rendered is entitled to have execution issue as a matter of right without any string attached to it, provided only that the execution does not deviate materially from the judgment. It is not essential to the validity of an execution that the utmost possible strictness should be observed in reciting the judgment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STAY OF EXECUTION NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR PROPER LEGAL REMEDY. — A stay cannot be substituted for a proper legal remedy, such as an appeal, audita querekka, action at law, or bill in equity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STAY MORATORIUM ORDER, SCOPE OF. — The moratorium order refers to the suspension of payment of debts and other monetary obligations, and does not apply to an execution not involving any payment of money.
2. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION AS MATTER OF RIGHT EXECUTION NOT TO DEVIATE, MATERIALLY FROM JUDGMENT. — Upon the expiration of the time of appeal when no appeal has been rendered is entitled to have execution issue as a matter of right without any string attached to it, provided only that the execution does not deviate materially from the judgment. It is not essential to the validity of an execution that the utmost possible strictness should be observed in reciting the judgment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STAY OF EXECUTION NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR PROPER LEGAL REMEDY. — A stay cannot be substituted for a proper legal remedy, such as an appeal, audita querekka, action at law, or bill in equity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STAY MORATORIUM ORDER, SCOPE OF. — The moratorium order refers to the suspension of payment of debts and other monetary obligations, and does not apply to an execution not involving any payment of money.
D E C I S I O N
TUASON, J.:
The petitioners apply for a writ of certiorari to determine the validity of two orders of the Honorable Antonio Cañizares, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
It appears that in civil case No. 18 of that court, judgment of the following tenor was rendered under date of March 25, 1944:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and orders that said defendants receive from the Clerk of this court the sum of P1,000 deposited with that official by the plaintiffs in full satisfaction of the loan obtained by said plaintiffs from the defendants on July 3, 1941, executing at the same time the necessary deed of conveyance providing for the return of the land and its possession to the plaintiffs. The defendants are further ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P6 as expenses of consignation which amount shall be deducted from the deposit of P1,000. With costs against the defendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
This judgment was not appealed, and on August 29, 1944, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for its execution, after which the defendants surrendered to the plaintiffs the possession of the property in question, or as the defendants now allege, the plaintiffs entered upon that possession without their consent.
On January 24, 1947, Hilarion Resurreccion, one of the plaintiffs, for himself and in behalf of his co-plaintiffs, made another motion to require the defendants to deposit with the clerk of court, for delivery to the plaintiffs, the transfer certificate of title pertaining to the aforesaid land. Objection seems to have been made to the latter motion although no copy of it is in the record of this proceeding, and the reasons adduced in support of the objection do not appear. Acting on the last motion and on defendants’ opposition thereto, Judge Cañizares denied the petition. His Honor went farther and "ordered (the execution) suspended until such time as the Government shall have determined its policy on the question of debt moratorium and on the value to be given the Japanese war currency circulated in the Philippines during its occupation by the Japanese." In addition the court directed the clerk "to furnish certified copies of this order and the decision of the Court in this case to the register of deeds of Quezon Province, with instructions to have them attached to certificate of title No. 10787." The grounds of the court’s refusal to issue execution are thus stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Since the action herein involved a monetary obligation payable within the Philippines and contracted prior to the liberation of this country from the Japanese, it seems clear that it is governed by the Executive Order No. 32, April, 1945, which amends Executive Order No. 25. Under the provisions of the said Executive Order and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Palacio v. Daza, 42 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 55, ’enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, . . . is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.’"
But on motion for reconsideration by the plaintiffs the court modified its previous order or made a new requirement. It would authorize the execution of the judgment if the plaintiffs should make a new deposit in the Republic of the Philippines currency. The dispository part of the second order is couched in these terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the foregoing reasons, the Court arrives at the conclusion that no writ of execution can be issued in this case until and after plaintiffs have replaced the sum of P1,000 in Japanese war notes which they deposited with the Clerk of this Court during the Japanese occupation with an equal amount of P1,000 in the present legal tender, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the Rules of Court and as a matter of public policy, jurisdiction over the cause ceases with the expiration of the time to appeal, and thereafter the court has no power to correct or amend the judgment. This rule and the reasons behind it are too familiar to every practitioner to call for elaboration or citation of authorities.
It has been seen that the judgment had not only become final but its main object had been carried out: the possession of the land had been recovered by the plaintiffs. To complete the execution, the plaintiffs only wanted to have the defendants give back to them their certificate of title. In requiring the plaintiffs to make a deposit in current legal tender to replace the deposit in Japanese military notes of the same face value or denomination, which the plaintiffs made upon or before the institution of the action in 1943, the court would modify the judgment after it has passed beyond its authority to materially alter. It would impose upon the plaintiffs for the issuance of execution a new condition not contemplated in, if it does not run counter to, the judgment. It would compel the plaintiffs to pay the defendants another amount in substitution for a deposit which the judgment has declared valid and sufficient to discharge the plaintiffs’ obligation.
One other well-known rule is that upon the expiration of the time to appeal when no appeal has been perfected the party in whose favor the judgment has been rendered is entitled to have execution issue as a matter of right without any string attached to it (sec. 1, Rule 31), provided only that the execution does not deviate materially from the judgment. The motion for the return to the plaintiffs of their certificate of title, which is in the nature of a motion for execution, conforms substantially to the judgment. Although the judgment is silent as to the delivery of the certificate of time to the plaintiffs, it is a necessary corollary of the judgment that the defendants restore the land and execute a deed of reconveyance to their opponents. It is not essential to the validity of an execution that the utmost possible strictness should be observed in reciting the judgment. (23 C. J., 403.)
If the defendants believe that by reason of the Japanese war notes having become worthless they are entitled to be paid now in Philippine legitimate money, they will have to institute a separate action. The subsequent outlawing of the Japanese military notes is not a good ground for a stay of execution. "A stay cannot be substituted for a proper legal remedy, such as an appeal, audita querella, action at law, or bill in equity." (23 C. J., 521.) In saying that the defendants may bring an independent suit to recover the equivalent of the deposit that has been rendered valueless, we are not to be understood as insinuating that the defendants have a good cause. We are not expressing any opinion pro and con on the merits of the suggested step. We are merely pointing out the course open to the defendants if they persist in their contention, and that the present case is definitely closed to any more designed to amend the judgment in a matter of substance.
The second order does not state whether it overrules or abandons the underlying reason of the first order. It seems that it does. Lest this be not the case, we want to say that the moratorium order has absolutely no bearing on the execution of the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The moratorium order refers to the suspension of payment of debts and other monetary obligations. The execution applied for by the plaintiffs does not involve any payment of money. It is to the defendants that money, if any, is due, the parties against and not for whom execution is sought.
The two orders complained of are beyond the jurisdiction of the court below to make and the writ will be granted, with the costs of this proceeding charged to the respondents excluding the respondent Judge. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.
FERIA, J.:
It appears that in civil case No. 18 of that court, judgment of the following tenor was rendered under date of March 25, 1944:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and orders that said defendants receive from the Clerk of this court the sum of P1,000 deposited with that official by the plaintiffs in full satisfaction of the loan obtained by said plaintiffs from the defendants on July 3, 1941, executing at the same time the necessary deed of conveyance providing for the return of the land and its possession to the plaintiffs. The defendants are further ordered to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P6 as expenses of consignation which amount shall be deducted from the deposit of P1,000. With costs against the defendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
This judgment was not appealed, and on August 29, 1944, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for its execution, after which the defendants surrendered to the plaintiffs the possession of the property in question, or as the defendants now allege, the plaintiffs entered upon that possession without their consent.
On January 24, 1947, Hilarion Resurreccion, one of the plaintiffs, for himself and in behalf of his co-plaintiffs, made another motion to require the defendants to deposit with the clerk of court, for delivery to the plaintiffs, the transfer certificate of title pertaining to the aforesaid land. Objection seems to have been made to the latter motion although no copy of it is in the record of this proceeding, and the reasons adduced in support of the objection do not appear. Acting on the last motion and on defendants’ opposition thereto, Judge Cañizares denied the petition. His Honor went farther and "ordered (the execution) suspended until such time as the Government shall have determined its policy on the question of debt moratorium and on the value to be given the Japanese war currency circulated in the Philippines during its occupation by the Japanese." In addition the court directed the clerk "to furnish certified copies of this order and the decision of the Court in this case to the register of deeds of Quezon Province, with instructions to have them attached to certificate of title No. 10787." The grounds of the court’s refusal to issue execution are thus stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Since the action herein involved a monetary obligation payable within the Philippines and contracted prior to the liberation of this country from the Japanese, it seems clear that it is governed by the Executive Order No. 32, April, 1945, which amends Executive Order No. 25. Under the provisions of the said Executive Order and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Palacio v. Daza, 42 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 55, ’enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, . . . is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.’"
But on motion for reconsideration by the plaintiffs the court modified its previous order or made a new requirement. It would authorize the execution of the judgment if the plaintiffs should make a new deposit in the Republic of the Philippines currency. The dispository part of the second order is couched in these terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the foregoing reasons, the Court arrives at the conclusion that no writ of execution can be issued in this case until and after plaintiffs have replaced the sum of P1,000 in Japanese war notes which they deposited with the Clerk of this Court during the Japanese occupation with an equal amount of P1,000 in the present legal tender, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the Rules of Court and as a matter of public policy, jurisdiction over the cause ceases with the expiration of the time to appeal, and thereafter the court has no power to correct or amend the judgment. This rule and the reasons behind it are too familiar to every practitioner to call for elaboration or citation of authorities.
It has been seen that the judgment had not only become final but its main object had been carried out: the possession of the land had been recovered by the plaintiffs. To complete the execution, the plaintiffs only wanted to have the defendants give back to them their certificate of title. In requiring the plaintiffs to make a deposit in current legal tender to replace the deposit in Japanese military notes of the same face value or denomination, which the plaintiffs made upon or before the institution of the action in 1943, the court would modify the judgment after it has passed beyond its authority to materially alter. It would impose upon the plaintiffs for the issuance of execution a new condition not contemplated in, if it does not run counter to, the judgment. It would compel the plaintiffs to pay the defendants another amount in substitution for a deposit which the judgment has declared valid and sufficient to discharge the plaintiffs’ obligation.
One other well-known rule is that upon the expiration of the time to appeal when no appeal has been perfected the party in whose favor the judgment has been rendered is entitled to have execution issue as a matter of right without any string attached to it (sec. 1, Rule 31), provided only that the execution does not deviate materially from the judgment. The motion for the return to the plaintiffs of their certificate of title, which is in the nature of a motion for execution, conforms substantially to the judgment. Although the judgment is silent as to the delivery of the certificate of time to the plaintiffs, it is a necessary corollary of the judgment that the defendants restore the land and execute a deed of reconveyance to their opponents. It is not essential to the validity of an execution that the utmost possible strictness should be observed in reciting the judgment. (23 C. J., 403.)
If the defendants believe that by reason of the Japanese war notes having become worthless they are entitled to be paid now in Philippine legitimate money, they will have to institute a separate action. The subsequent outlawing of the Japanese military notes is not a good ground for a stay of execution. "A stay cannot be substituted for a proper legal remedy, such as an appeal, audita querella, action at law, or bill in equity." (23 C. J., 521.) In saying that the defendants may bring an independent suit to recover the equivalent of the deposit that has been rendered valueless, we are not to be understood as insinuating that the defendants have a good cause. We are not expressing any opinion pro and con on the merits of the suggested step. We are merely pointing out the course open to the defendants if they persist in their contention, and that the present case is definitely closed to any more designed to amend the judgment in a matter of substance.
The second order does not state whether it overrules or abandons the underlying reason of the first order. It seems that it does. Lest this be not the case, we want to say that the moratorium order has absolutely no bearing on the execution of the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The moratorium order refers to the suspension of payment of debts and other monetary obligations. The execution applied for by the plaintiffs does not involve any payment of money. It is to the defendants that money, if any, is due, the parties against and not for whom execution is sought.
The two orders complained of are beyond the jurisdiction of the court below to make and the writ will be granted, with the costs of this proceeding charged to the respondents excluding the respondent Judge. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J.:
I concur in the result.
PABLO, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Disiento. Me parece injusta la opinion de la mayoria.
El 25 de Marzo de 1944 el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Quezon condeno a los demandados a recibir de la escribania de dicho Juzgado la cantidad de P1,000 depositados por los demandantes en completa satisfaccion de la deuda contraida por ellos en 3 de Julio de 1941, otorgando a favor de los mismos la necesaria escritura para la devolucion del terreno.
Los demandantes al iniciar la demanda consignaron la cantidad de P1,000 en papel moneda japonesa en la escribania porque los demandados rehusaron recibirla. El articulo 1176 del Codigo Civil es del tenor siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Si el acreedor a quien se hiciere el ofrecimiento de pego se negare sin razon a admitirlo, el deudor quedara libre de responsabilidad mediante la consignacion de la cosa debida.
"La consignacion por si sola producira el mismo efecto cuando se haga estando el acreedor ausente o cuando este incapacitado para recibir el pago en el momento en que deba hacerse, y cuando varias personas pretendan tener derecho a cobrar, o se haya extraviado el titulo de la obligacion."cralaw virtua1aw library
En este caso particular los demandados estuvieron justificados al negarse a recibir el pago porque la moneda con la cual los demandantes querian saldar su obligacion no era la moneda convenida. La deuda ha sido contraida en 3 de Julio de 1941 y es de suponer que las partes convinieron en que el pago se ha de hacer en igual moneda, no en papel-moneda militar japonesa porque, ni por imaginacion, creyeron que habia de sobrevenir la guerra. Segun proclama del General-en-Jefe del ejercito invasor japones de fecha 6 de Febrero de 1942, el aprobo la circulacion de la moneda filipina legitima con la moneda militar japonesa. (1 Off. Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, 3d Ed., 38.) No estaba prohibida la moneda filipina legitima; por tanto, no estaban entonces obligados los demandados a recibir el pago de su credito en moneda militar japonesa: tenian derecho a exigir el pago en moneda filipina legal. La consignacion hecha entonces en este caso en la escribania del Juzgado no es equivalente al pago: tenian razon los demandados a no admitirla. Ahora que el dinero consignado no tiene ningun valor,
PABLO, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Disiento. Me parece injusta la opinion de la mayoria.
El 25 de Marzo de 1944 el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Quezon condeno a los demandados a recibir de la escribania de dicho Juzgado la cantidad de P1,000 depositados por los demandantes en completa satisfaccion de la deuda contraida por ellos en 3 de Julio de 1941, otorgando a favor de los mismos la necesaria escritura para la devolucion del terreno.
Los demandantes al iniciar la demanda consignaron la cantidad de P1,000 en papel moneda japonesa en la escribania porque los demandados rehusaron recibirla. El articulo 1176 del Codigo Civil es del tenor siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Si el acreedor a quien se hiciere el ofrecimiento de pego se negare sin razon a admitirlo, el deudor quedara libre de responsabilidad mediante la consignacion de la cosa debida.
"La consignacion por si sola producira el mismo efecto cuando se haga estando el acreedor ausente o cuando este incapacitado para recibir el pago en el momento en que deba hacerse, y cuando varias personas pretendan tener derecho a cobrar, o se haya extraviado el titulo de la obligacion."cralaw virtua1aw library
En este caso particular los demandados estuvieron justificados al negarse a recibir el pago porque la moneda con la cual los demandantes querian saldar su obligacion no era la moneda convenida. La deuda ha sido contraida en 3 de Julio de 1941 y es de suponer que las partes convinieron en que el pago se ha de hacer en igual moneda, no en papel-moneda militar japonesa porque, ni por imaginacion, creyeron que habia de sobrevenir la guerra. Segun proclama del General-en-Jefe del ejercito invasor japones de fecha 6 de Febrero de 1942, el aprobo la circulacion de la moneda filipina legitima con la moneda militar japonesa. (1 Off. Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, 3d Ed., 38.) No estaba prohibida la moneda filipina legitima; por tanto, no estaban entonces obligados los demandados a recibir el pago de su credito en moneda militar japonesa: tenian derecho a exigir el pago en moneda filipina legal. La consignacion hecha entonces en este caso en la escribania del Juzgado no es equivalente al pago: tenian razon los demandados a no admitirla. Ahora que el dinero consignado no tiene ningun valor,
